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JOHN R. BROWN*

"Whisky's fer Drinkin'; Water's fer
Fightin'!" Is It? Resolving a Collective
Action Dilemma in New Mexico
ABSTRACT
The water budget of New Mexico's Middle Rio Grande region
incurs annually a deficit of 55,000 acre-feet through groundwater
mining. To address this unsustainable condition, a Statemandated regional water planning effort involving significant
public participation is underway to produce a regional water
plan. The action arena where this process is taking place may not
be appropriately constituted to enable stakeholders to agree on
and implement a comprehensive plan to "balance all desired and
required uses with sustainablesupply." The heterogeneity of the
actors and their interests and the complexity of the decision
situations they face contribute to a high level of uncertainty about
the outcome. Changing the rules of the game to encourage
interested actors to negotiate partial solutions to the problem may
increase incentives for participation and cooperation and allow
more productive institutionalarrangementsto emerge.

Sin agua la tierra no vale nada.'
[Wiater is.. .a resource whose characteristics tend to induce
cooperation, and incite violence only in the exception.2

Executive Director, New Mexico Water Dialogue. M.A. (1968), University of
California, Los Angeles.
1. New Mexico dicho or saying, which when translated means, "Without water the
land has no value."
2. Aaron T. Wolf, Conflict and Cooperation Along International Waterways, 1 WATER
POLIcY 251, 251 (1998). To be more accurate, the quoted sentence actually begins, "These
patterns suggest that the more valuable lesson of international water is as a resource...."
Wolf argues that in fact very few international wars are fought over water; most disputes
are settled by negotiation and treaty. But I believe that the argument holds true when considering domestic water disputes, as well.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Rivers in arid and semiarid lands engender cooperation and
conflict. More often than not, the stories people like to tell about water
stress the conflict. "Water-wise" people in the states of the U.S.
intermountain west enjoy repeating a saying they usually credit to Mark
Twain: "Whisky's fer drinkin'; water's fer fightin'!" The attribution is
probably wrong.3 It is a trivial error, but it swirls in an eddy of more
dangerous misperceptions. People talk casually-and unhelpfullyabout water wars. But "fightin"' is only one way humans have faced the
problem of providing and producing a reliable supply of water in a land
where its variability and uncertainty sometimes suggest that human life
may be impossible to sustain. In fact, cooperation was vital as people
learned to devise and use a variety of techniques to bring water to food
crops, as they have been doing in the Four Corners region for up to two
millennia.4 At first, irrigation agriculture was used to supplement, and
then later largely to supplant, hunting and gathering, enabling Pueblo
Indians and later arrivals to adapt successfully to the vagaries of
changing physical and political circumstances. In the process, people
have often fought each other for control of the sources of water. Conflict
is one part of the story. But more importantly, people have had to
cooperate on an ever-expanding scale to capture water, to share its lifesustaining benefits, to protect themselves from its fury, and, more
recently, to protect it from their increasing means to pollute it. It is their
cooperation that has made survival possible.
The Middle Rio Grande (MRG) region's water supply can be
viewed as a complex common-pool resource. It yields multiple private
and public benefits to heterogeneous consumptive and non-consumptive
users. Some uses are complementary; others compete. Each user may
resist being bound by outcomes of a process that would significantly (1)
reduce its share of the water supply, (2) interfere with its autonomy, or
(3) raise its transaction costs. Each has an incentive to bargain fiercely to
ensure that it is not a net loser in the principal constant-sum game: allocation of scarce water to its preferred uses. Actors likely to lose have
incentives to withdraw and to use other political or judicial arenas to
advance their claims.
These themes are currently being played out within regional
water planning processes across the state. A review of efforts to
3. "A lot of people have searched for that quote in Twain's known writings and
speeches and haven't found it yet-myself included! As such, it falls into that dreaded
'attributed' category." Email from Barbara Schmidt, Twain scholar, to John R. Brown (Sept.
22, 2000) (on file with author).
4. See DAVID E. STUART, ANASAZI AMERICA 35-39 (2000).
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cooperate in the Middle Rio Grande offers an opportunity to examine the
dynamics of conflict and collaboration. This article will focus on the
MRG Water Assembly, an organization intended to engage broad
stakeholder involvement in the process, and its relationships with a
variety of stakeholder interests. Then it will critically examine instances
of institutional conflict in assessing the Water Assembly's prospects for
achieving consensus around an integrated, or holistic, comprehensive
plan. Finally, it will explore the possibility that at least partial solutions
to many of the problems identified earlier may be achieved by
encouraging a more adaptive, polycentric' approach to plan negotiations
and development.
II. HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE REGION
During the American Territorial period from 1848 up until 1912,
when New Mexico became the forty-seventh state to be admitted to the
union, the territory experienced a quiet revolution in terms of both the
conceptual basis and the operating rules for the governance and
management of its water. The Indian Pueblos and Hispano acequia
communities that had controlled the water locally and had developed
among themselves institutions for its equitable allocation ceased to be
the only appropriators of surface water from the Rio Grande and its
tributaries. These widely scattered irrigation communities had worked
out systems of rules, grounded in custom and tradition and in practical
knowledge of the local landscapes and balancing use with supply, that
had for at least a century and a half enabled them to survive. The rules
were designed for a subsistence way of life. They required appropriators
to monitor each other's behavior and to sanction those who took more
than their share or failed in their responsibilities to the collective. The
acequia association was the source of their limited rights to the resource
they termed the "lifeblood of the community."
Anglo newcomers arriving in the last half of the nineteenth
century challenged traditional institutional arrangements. They viewed
the ecological adaptations to arid lands on which these institutions were
based as primitive. The newcomers embodied an ethic based on
America's manifest destiny that was fueled by the belief that they could

5. The term was coined by scholars at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy
Analysis at Indiana University to suggest that democratic self-governance does not require
a single center of power, but should "be envisioned as an activity that goes on in many
arenas simultaneously, at many scales of aggregation." POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT: READINGS

FROM THE WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY AND

ANALYSIS xii (Michael McGinnis ed., 1999).

POLICY
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and, by right, should harness nature to meet human needs.6 They
promoted more ambitious ideas about what could be accomplished by
irrigation agriculture in New Mexico's river valleys, particularly the Rio
Grande. After 1879, the newcomers arrived by railroad, rather than by
oxcart or horse-drawn wagon, and in the 30-year period between 1880
and 1910 the state's population jumped by over 170 percent.
To the arrivistes and entrepreneurs, local control of the state's
water by small-scale irrigators meant waste and inefficiency. But the
territorial legislature was not about to replace the old acequia system
directly. Instead, legislators created new mechanisms-including water
companies, irrigation districts, and later conservancy districts-through
which control of major tracts of land and, more importantly, the water
rights appurtenant to them, moved from community control into private
hands, while authority to allocate such rights was centralized in the
office of the Territorial (now State) Engineer." Passage of the Reclamation
Act by Congress in 1902, ushering in the water development period,
aided and abetted these trends.9
Rules and Rule-Ordered Behavior- "The Law of the River"
Today, Rio Grande water resources are allocated through a
complex set of institutions-known as "the Law of the River"-a number
of which are in conflict with each other when water runs short. A 1906
Treaty guaranteeing Mexico 60,000 acre-feet per year (except in the event
of extraordinary drought or serious accident to the irrigation system in
the United States) has legal supremacy but has not lately been the subject
of much controversy, although this may change as transboundary issues
gain in importance. ° The overriding mechanism for allocating water
between New Mexico and Texas is the Rio Grande Compact. Formulas in
the Compact determine how much water Colorado is required to deliver
to New Mexico and how much New Mexico must deliver to Texas. New
Mexico's delivery requirement is a function of the native flow of the Rio
Grande at the Otowi gage, to the north of the MRG planning region.
6. For a discussion of utilitarian views of the environment in American social
thought, see generally JEANNE NIENABER CLARK & HANNA J. CORTNER, THE STATE AND
NATURE: VOICES HEARD, VOICES UNHEARD IN AMERICA'S ENVIRONMENTAL

DIALOGUE

(2002).
7. JOHN 0. BAXTER, DIVIDING NEW MEXICO'S WATERS, 1700-1912,81 (1997).
8. A fascinating account of how this occurred can be found in G. Emlen Hall, Tularosa
and the Dismantlingof New Mexico Community Ditches, 75 N.M. HIST. REV. 77 (2000).
9. BAXTER, supra note 7 at 104-09.
10. Convention for Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande, May 21,
1906, art. I-IlI, available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/FORAFFAI/body-1906conv.htm
(last visited Mar. 31, 2003).
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Between these two points, New Mexico is entitled to deplete annually an
amount of native Rio Grande water that depends on the flow at Otowi,
but not more than 405 thousand acre-feet."
In addition to native flow, additional water comes into the Rio
Grande from tributaries of the Colorado River across the Continental
Divide. Brought by tunnels through the mountains, this water reaches
the Rio Grande via the Chama River. One of the chief beneficiaries of this
San Juan-Chama diversion project is the City of Albuquerque, as
discussed below. Water is considered delivered to Texas when it passes
over Elephant Butte Dam in southern New Mexico.
The compact, however, does not stand alone. Besides the United
States-Mexico treaty noted above, federal laws, including the Clean
Water Act and the Endangered Species Act; federal and state court
decisions; and administrative rules complicate the regime. Some of these
will be noted in the discussion of the actors and their strategies below.
One generally important rule is the New Mexico State Engineer's longstanding requirement for conjunctive surface and groundwater
management. Groundwater withdrawals result in river flow depletions,
even though the effects may not be immediately noticeable. The amount
can be estimated as a function of lagged past pumping. The State
Engineer requires pumpers to offset these losses through purchase and
retirement of other surface rights or by other means. This becomes
relevant in considering the City of Albuquerque's current municipal and
industrial use and future plans, and their implications for other uses and
users.
The institutions in place to govern the macro dynamics of river
management and control-the Law of the River-act principally to
allocate the resources of the Rio Grande as an interstate and international
waterway, and also to achieve other federal policy purposes, many of
which enjoy considerable local support as well as substantial opposition
from some quarters. This suggests the source of possible conflict. Except
for federally reserved water rights applicable to federal installations and
Indian tribes, water rights are recognized by or created through the State
of New Mexico. Reallocations to meet federal demands take water from
holders whose appropriative rights are based in state law.
11. Resolution Adopted by Rio Grande Compact Commission (Feb. 1948) Changing
Gaging Stations and Measurements of Deliveries by New Mexico (amending art. IV of the
Compact), available at http://southwest.fws.gov/mrgbi/Resources/RGCompact/rgcompact.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2003).
12. Office of the State Engineer administrative guidelines now require applicants for
new groundwater withdrawal permits to identify and retire 100% of offsetting water rights
as a condition of approval. Middle Rio Grande Administrative Area Guidelines for Review
of Water Right Applications, Sept. 22, 2000, available at hnp://www.seo.state.nm.us/doingbusiness/mrgbasin/mrgbasin.html.
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Another source of institutional ambiguity in New Mexico is
tension between the formal system of rules governing the allocation of
water and administration of water rights and informal rules based on
custom and tradition. Though property rights in water are based largely
on a holder's ability to establish beneficial use more or less continuously
from a priority date, New Mexico has a strong tradition that such rights
are attached to appurtenant land, and that transfers should not be made
too easily. Both individual and community interests have been asserted
in successful objections to water right transfers from traditional
agricultural uses, thus raising transaction costs and slowing the
development of unfettered markets in water rights.
All this complexity might be of little concern, except that in the
last decades of the twentieth century, these and other demands on the
water in the Rio Grande-and on the aquifer to which it is connectedbegan to outstrip the annually renewable supply. It appears that in the
twenty-first century, the existing regimes for managing and allocating
New Mexico's waters will be inadequate to balance the state's needs
effectively. Enter regional water planning.
III. REGIONAL WATER PLANNING IN NEW MEXICO
Regional water planning in New Mexico can be viewed as a set
of local responses to specific circumstances in a physical and institutional
context. Three overlapping contextual elements predominate. The first
relates primarily to "place." The idea of place involves both the
particular physical attributes of the situation in which water is
understood to be a scarce resource and the characteristics that people
assign to water itself in this environment. The second element involves
the rules and rule-ordered relationships that govern the allocation of
water within a complex intergovernmental and international system. As
we will see, a single federal court decision in the legal arena acted as an
immediate trigger that initiated regional water planning efforts
throughout the state. The third element has to do with the influence of
shared knowledge and understanding in shaping decision situations;13
that is, the extent to which a shared consciousness exists across
communities of understanding among New Mexicans about the values
they attach to water and their preferences for its governance.

13. See VINCENT OSTROM, THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY AND THE VULNERABILITY OF
DEMOCRACIES: A RESPONSE TO TOCQUEVILLE'S CHALLENGE 96 (1997).
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Place
The MRG water-planning region occurs within three counties in
west-central New Mexico within the drainage of the Rio Grande. The
middle reach of the river is defined politically by the northern and
eastern borders of Sandoval County at the upstream end and the
southern border of Valencia County at the downstream end.14 The
distance between these points along the river is about 160 miles. The
region encompasses an area of 5495 square miles (slightly larger than the
state of Connecticut), and contains a population of about 700,000,
seventy-eight percent of whom live in the greater Albuquerque
metropolitan area. Most of the lands of eight American Indian Pueblos
lie within the region. (See Map 1.)
Map 1 - The Middle Rio Grande Water Planning Region

14. More commonly, the middle Rio Grande in New Mexico extends from the Otowi
gage just below the confluence of the Rio Chama with the Rio Grande to Elephant Butte
Dam. Socorro and Sierra counties, however, opted out of participating in the MRG waterplanning region. When discussed in terms of the Rio Grande's entire reach, the upper basin
extends from the headwaters in Colorado to Ft. Quitman, Texas (where it now typically
dries up). The lower basin continues to outline the Texas-Mexico border to the Gulf of
Mexico, fed by new water from the Conchas in Mexico and the Pecos from the Texas side.
(In Mexico, the river is known as the Rio Bravo.)
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Though wide variation and unpredictability in precipitation
amounts from year to year are well understood as facts of life in New
Mexico, only in recent years has it become obvious that on most stream
systems water use is rapidly approaching the physical limits of the
resource. The growth of cities as major users has engendered new
conflicts among competing uses and jurisdictions. There is little slack in
the system as it is currently managed, and water managers face
constrained choices. Moreover, the scope of water demand is no longer
limited to the control of water rights by a narrow set of consumptive
users; it has broadened to encompass increasing public concerns about
issues of water quality and the health of riparian environments.
Rules
In the early 1980s, the city of El Paso, Texas, applied for a permit
to appropriate ground water from New Mexico. The New Mexico State
Engineer denied the application on the basis of a statute barring the
export of the state's groundwater resources.15 El Paso sued, and a federal
court ruled that the statute violated the interstate commerce clause of the
U.S. Constitution. 6 This decision prompted the New Mexico legislature
in 1985 to create a constitutionally valid rationale to prevent the
uncontrolled transfer of water out-of-state. The U.S. Supreme Court
ruling, on which the federal district court relied in its El Paso decision,
held that a state does have a right to limit water exports to protect the
health and well being of its citizens, so long as its statutes "regulate
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest."17
The linchpin of the legislature's effort was to amend several
statutes by adding "conservation" and "public welfare" to existing requirements for non-impairment, as mandatory tests for the approval or
denial of applications for new appropriations or transfers of water rights.
Importantly, whether a proposed appropriation or transfer is deemed
"not contrary to the conservation of water... and.. .not detrimental
to the
public welfare" applies to all applications, both interstate and within
New Mexico.'
The legislature did not define "public welfare," or list specific
priorities among uses. Like most western states, New Mexico asserts
public ownership of "all natural waters flowing in streams and

15. El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983).
16. Id. at 392. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
17. Consuelo Bokum, Implementing the Public Welfare Requirement in New Mexico's Water
Code, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 441, 453 (1996), citing Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
18. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-6, 72-5-7, 72-5-23 (Supp. 1985).
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watercourses" 9 and makes these waters "subject to appropriation for
21
beneficial use. " 20Groundwater basins and aquifers are also public. The
rule allocates water on the basis of the doctrine of prior appropriation:
"Priority in time shall give the better right."' The "basis, measure and
limit" of such rights is beneficial use, with all such uses being treated
equally.'
Although by its 1985 amendments the legislature clearly
intended to signal that not every beneficial use should necessarily be
regarded as consistent with the public welfare, more than 80 years of
precedent had sanctified the idea that property rights in water were
based solely on priority in time. In other words, the value of a water
right is to be measured only by its seniority, rather than any other
measure of priority. Two years later, in passing the law that established a
process and authorized funding for regional water planning, the
legislature again ducked the issue, requiring only that planners give an
"adequate review of water conservation and the effect on the public
24
welfare."
Common Knowledge and Understanding
Competing claims on an increasingly scarce supply have led to
heightened awareness among both traditional stakeholders and
advocates for non-consumptive environmental and recreational interests
that not only is the water supply over appropriated, but also that the
existing institutions for managing water are inadequate to resolve the
conflicts that are apt to arise in any situation of shortage. The results of a
statewide survey conducted in 2000 by the University of New Mexico's
(UNM) Institute for Public Policy suggest the outlines of an emerging
public consensus, with clear majorities agreeing on the relative value of
alternative water uses and policy preferences.n Neither the official prior
19. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-1 (1941).
20. N.M. CONST. art XVI, § 2.
21. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-2 (1907). See also N.M. CONST. art XVI, § 2.
22. N. M. Stat. Ann. § 72-1-2; see also N.M. Const. art XVI § 2.
23. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 3. In New Mexico, beneficial use has historically been
thought to require the diversion of water for an economic purpose. The idea that "instream
flow" for the benefit of the ecological system or the health of specific species might be
considered "beneficial" has only begun to win grudging acceptance. No New Mexico law
recognizes such a "use" of water, but a New Mexico Attorney General's opinion in 1998
suggested that nothing in the New Mexico Constitution, statutes or case law would
preclude it. Opinion of Tom Udall, Attorney General, Opinion No. 98-01, March 27,1998.
24. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-14-44C(6) (Supp. 1987).
25. JOHN R. BROWN ET AL., UNIV. OF NEW MEXICO INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, ATTITUDES
AND PREFERENCES OF RESIDENTS OF THE MIDDLE Rio GRANDE WATER PLANNING REGION
REGARDING WATER ISSUES: SUMMARY REPORT TO THE ACTION COMMITTEE OF THE MIDDLE
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appropriation system of New Mexico water law nor its logical
outgrowth, the development of market mechanisms for reallocating
senior water rights based on willingness to pay, appears to offer a
democratically acceptable basis on which to build new institutional
arrangements, capable of addressing these conflicts in a way that takes
such expressions of public preferences into account.
Developing a Planning Framework
The 1987 legislation that authorized regional water planning
reflects the New Mexico legislature's recognition that values about water
vary widely among regions within the state, and that regions should be
able to craft their own solutions in response to what water officials and
experts deem to be a real threat to New Mexico's water supply. That
said, very little policy direction was provided in the regional water
planning (RWP) law itself, beyond the assertion that the state's "future
water needs.. .can best be met by allowing each region... to plan for its
water future." 26 Indeed, recollections of those involved at the time
present a picture of a legislature reacting to a statewide crisis, while
wanting to ensure that the districts and regions that they represented
would not be adversely affected by attempts to expropriate "their"
water.27
The 1987 legislation assigned responsibility to the New Mexico
Interstate Stream Commission (ISC)2 for administering funding to a
Rio GRANDE WATER ASSEMBLY AND THE MIDDLE Rio GRANDE COUNCIL
OF GOVERNMENTS

(2000).
26. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-14-43 (Supp. 1987). In a literal sense, this is
not quite
accurate. Based on a report by the N.M. Water Resources Res. Institute and
the Univ. of
N.M. School of Law, State Appropriation of Unappropriated Groundwater: A
Strategy for
Insuring New Mexico a Water Future (Jan. 1986), the legislature did authorize
the Interstate
Stream Commission (ISC) to implement a program "to appropriate groundwater
or
purchase water ights on behalf of any of the various regions of the state"
in order "to
ensure an adequate supply of water for each region, as reflected in... [its] water
use plan."
The ISC does own water rights and continues to obtain them but has not
yet
implemented this provision, since appropriations were to be made pursuant
to shortfalls
and "public welfare" needs identified in regional water plans, most of
which are
uncompleted. "In principle, state appropriation and resale was the concept,
not unlike
what California is doing with electricity now." Interview with F. Lee Brown,
who led staff
efforts for the N.M. Water Law Study Committee, under whose auspices the
report was
prepared (Apr. 16, 2001).
27. Interviews with knowledgeable actors including F. Lee Brown, Consuelo
Bokum,
and John Carangelo.
28. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-14-4 (Supp. 1997). Created in 1935, the ISC has broad
powers
to investigate, protect, conserve and develop New Mexico's waters and stream
systems,
both interstate and intrastate. The commission is authorized to negotiate compacts
with
other states to settle interstate controversies, match congressional appropriations,
investigate and develop the water supplies of the state's stream systems, and institute
legal pro-
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"party or parties" within self-defined water planning regions. Such a
region must contain "sufficient hydrological and political interests in
common to make water planning feasible."' In determining funding
eligibility, the ISC was to consider whether the source and potential
place of use of the water were within the same hydrologic basin. If
funding was requested on a joint basis, the ISC was to consider whether
the parties had "demonstrated political and economic interests in
common by entering into a binding intergovernmental agreement for
"°
carrying out the planning process. '
Given the ambiguity of the state legislature's guidance, regional
self-definition and self-organization proceeded unevenly for several
years. Regions with the greatest sense of having a common political stake
and under the greatest threat of expropriation of their water were earliest
to organize and produce some form of plan. It is no accident that the first
plan submitted to the State Engineer in 1989 came from the Eastern
Plains region (Region 1), four of whose seven very rural counties share a
long border with Texas, as well as the shallow western edge of the
Ogallala Aquifer. (See Map 2.) The Eastern Plains shared with some
other multi-county regions the advantage of being able to adopt preexisting (since the 1960s) state planning district boundaries. These
regional planning coordination entities are loosely governed by councils
of governments (COGs)-voluntary associations representing municipalities, counties, and in some cases tribes and special districts.

ceedings. Eight of its nine members are appointed by the governor for six-year terms and
represent major irrigation districts or sections of the state. The commission elects its chair.
The State Engineer is its ninth member and secretary and directs the work of its staff.
When the legislature created the regional water planning process in 1987 to protect
New Mexico waters and to provide for regional growth and development consistent with
the available water resource, the ISC became the agency responsible for granting RWP
funds and overseeing regional water plans. Funding for planning in 16 regions was
sporadic and never exceeded $350,000 between 1987 and 1998. For Fiscal Year 1999, the
legislature appropriated $1,750,000 for regional water planning and for a companion
program to develop a State Water Plan to integrate and reconcile the regional plans.
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-14-44D (Supp. 1987).
30. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-14-44F(2) (Supp. 1987).
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Map 2 - New Mexico's Water Planning Regions*

*Solid lines show planning region boundaries. Lighter dashed lines show
county boundaries.

During the first five years following enactment of the RWP bill,
regions formed and re-formed as they determined their shared
hydrologic and political interests. Though many actors were local
officials, voluntary organizations began to take shape, built around
individuals with interests in water, whether agricultural, municipal,
industrial, or environmental. For some, their motives included finding a
way to accommodate different interests and reconcile conflicts. Others
were willing to share their technical expertise in hydrology or other
water-related fields. As one witness to the early efforts across the state
describes it:
Regions had self-identified as best they could and were
struggling to figure out what a plan was (or should be).
They knew only they should figure out how much water
they had, and would have in the future, and what they
were using it for and how much they would need in the
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future, and somehow reconcile [all of this] 40 years down
the road. They also had to include tribes [in their region] in
the process.. .and they had to have a representative
planning body [or] steering committee. These last two
things maybe weren't in the legislation, but somehow they
were a given. In fact, the San Juan Basin RWP grant
application was sent back [by the ISCI for revision because
31
it did not mention Navajos.
Into this fluid situation in 1992 stepped the Western Network, a
non-profit consulting firm created to provide services in environmental
and natural resource dispute resolution. Western Network staff, under a
Ford Foundation grant, focused their first efforts on the Pecos River in
eastern New Mexico. They soon discovered that planners in the three
regions that include the Pecos watershed were frustrated by the lack of
ISC guidance and eager to share information that could help make their
plans compatible. A two-day working meeting in August 1992 was
considered a great success as small-scale acequia-based farmers and
large-scale irrigators from the Carlsbad Irrigation District, among a
diverse body of users, discovered how much they had in common.
Additional funding for what became the "Regional Water Planning
Dialogue" facilitated similar processes with other regions, culminating in
a statewide meeting in 1994, at which participants created a board and a
of community
mission statement and "whipped each other
3 2 into a frenzy
planning."
grassroots
[and]
empowerment
From their first efforts with the three Pecos regions, Dialogue
participants maintained an uneasy relationship with the ISC. The
appointed commission and its staff had been reluctant to assert the
authority of the ISC, given the legislature's finding that each region
should "plan for its water future"; yet from the regions' viewpoint,
funding support was meager, and decisions about what constituted an
adequate proposal or plan element seemed arbitrary. Dialogue board
members were ambivalent about whether they were watchdogs or
partners with the ISC in facilitating regional processes. Regional
planners sought guidance but also predictability from the ISC. Following
the 1994 meeting, the ISC called on Dialogue board members to assist in

31. Interview with Lucy Moore, founder of the New Mexico Water Dialogue (Jan. 23,
2001). The 1987 legislation had required the ISC to develop criteria for regions to receive
planning funds, including one criterion providing for "use of an appropriate planning
process including opportunities for participation by those Indian tribes located within the
various regions of the state" N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-14-44C(2) (Supp. 1987).
32. Id.
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designing a Regional Water Planning Handbook.33 A key feature of the
Handbook is a template of elements to be included in all regional water
plans. Though specific provisions of the template are still subjects of
some dispute, from an institutional analysis perspective the Handbook is
significant in several respects.
Most regional water planning groups understood broad-based
public participation to be necessary to the creation of any plan that might
have a reasonable chance of being implemented by public authorities.
The Handbook recognized these "rules-in-use" and built flexible but
extensive requirements for stakeholder participation into the planning
requirements. The idea that public participation is essential, not only to
local legitimacy but to a proper understanding of public welfare, thus
became no longer simply a working assumption of regional planners,
but an accepted tenet of state water policy.
The template requires that regional planners gather and
assimilate several sorts of information about the physical, economic,
demographic, and historical characteristics of the region and its water
uses; that they understand and document the legal and institutional
constraints affecting the region; that they assess the water resources
available in terms of the sources and amounts of water supply and its
quality for both surface and ground water; and that they document
current uses and project future demand by a 40-year planning horizon.4
The requirement to develop shared time-and-place-specific information
about these matters was explicitly designed to contribute to a common
knowledge and understanding among participants of the collective
action situation facing everyone in the region.
Thus, both the state's mandates and its flexibility have helped to
structure the "action situation" faced by actors in each region. The
elements of an action situation that affect actors' choices of strategy are
33. N.M. INTERSTATE STREAM COMM'N, REGIONAL WATER PLANNING HANDBOOK,
(1994) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
34. The HANDBOOK uses the term "planner" broadly to refer to whoever is involved in
any regional water planning process. The term does not imply a preference for leadership
by a cadre of planning professionals. Instead, the HANDBOOK emphasizes the interest of
regional participants for encouraging "local people to express local concerns and discuss
the difficult decisions faced by every community in New Mexico." Id. at 3. However, the
ISC (whose composition is affected by new gubernatorial appointments) and its staff have
not been as consistent in their support of regional autonomy and local decision making
over time. In 1998, after a hiatus occasioned by its concern that too much money had been
spent with little result, the legislature provided new funding to support regional planning
($1 million, plus $750,000 for developing a state framework plan). However, increased
concern for "accountability for funds and responsibility for plan products" led to changes
in funding arrangements and to requirements in planning proposals for a "detailed work
breakdown structure for (a) water supply assessment, (b) water demand analysis and (c)
options for balancing supply and demand." Memorandum from Brian C. Wilson, Chief,
Water Use and Conservation Bureau, to Files (Mar. 6, 1998).
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complex and, as Vincent Ostrom reminds us, involve an "epistemic
element-the place of common knowledge and communities of shared
understanding in decision situations."- The requirements and
opportunities afforded by the RWP process have had the effect of
encouraging the development of broadly shared knowledge and
understanding about the nature of the problem each region confronts.
IV. WATER PLANNING WITHIN THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE
VALLEY
The New Mexico legislature authorized regional water planning
in 1987. Within four years, the MRG Council of Governments
(MRGCOG) concluded, largely on the basis of studies conducted in the
1960s and 1970s, that the "demand for water is less than the sustainable
water supply of the region."3 MRGCOG produced a four-volume report
and ceased working on the issue. Then, in 1993, a study by the U.S.
Geological Survey showed that the Albuquerque Basin, the deep and
extensive aquifer on which local governments were relying to provide a
practically unlimited supply of water for urban growth, was far less
extensive than had been believed for a quarter of a century and was
being mined rapidly.37
Additional assessments validated these findings. In the summer
of 1996, the volume of the river was at one of the lowest levels on record;
however, the dominant water diverter in the region, the Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District, continued its deliveries to farmers
unabated. During the summer, a 45-mile reach of the Rio Grande below
Albuquerque dried up, causing the death of about 40 percent of the
endangered Rio Grande silvery minnow. These events, and the lawsuits
and recriminations that followed, convinced major users and interest
groups that coordinated action to balance demands with the supply of
water at sustainable levels was required.
In 1997, a small group of concerned water professionals,
including a number of faculty members from the University of New
Mexico (UNM), orchestrated a request from the State Engineer to UNM's
president. It asked the University to take the lead in creating a process
for developing a regional water plan with strong community and
stakeholder involvement. At this time, an attempt was also made to
35. OSTROM, supra note 13, at 102.
36. MIDDLE RIO GRANDE COUNCIL OF Gov'Ts, REGIONAL WATER PLANNING IN STATE
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT 3, VOL. 2: REGIONAL WATER RESOURCES 23 (1991).
37. CONDE THORN, DOUGLAS McADA & JOHN KERNODLE, WATER RESOURCES
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GEOHYDROLOGIc FRAMEWORK AND
INVESTIGATIONS,
HYDROLOGIC CONDITIONS IN THE ALBUQUERQUE BASIN (1993).
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enlist the Indian Pueblos in the MRG region in joining the State Engineer
in convening the First Assembly for Water Planning in the Middle Rio
Grande (Water Assembly).
The first Water Assembly was convened in August 1997. It
brought together educators, scientists and technical specialists from
federal agencies and private consulting firms, local water managers and
officials,
farmers,
business
and
industry
representatives,
environmentalists, and others to begin a process of evaluating the water
situation facing the Middle Rio Grande region. It succeeded in
energizing a diverse group of individuals who represented highly
divergent points of view but who were in agreement that planning must
be based on a shared understanding of the underlying facts about the
water situation. The Middle Rio Grande Water Assembly (as it came to
be called officially) set forth as its mission "to develop, through an open,
inclusive and participatory process, a plan of sustainable water
management strategies for the Middle Rio Grande Region and establish a
process to implement the plan."m
One of the first tasks of the Water Assembly's Action
Committee, created in November 1997, was to charge a work group of
hydrologists and other specialists-all volunteers in this effort-to
develop a "water budget," an inflow-outflow model of the region's
hydrologic system based on twenty-five year averages. This early
product of the Assembly's work confirmed that the system was barely
able to meet current needs and delivery requirements downstream, and
that the Albuquerque Basin aquifer was being mined at a rate of about
70,000 acre-feet per year.39 Population growth in the region's three
counties was 21 percent during the 1990-2000 decade, while estimates
for the "planning horizon" year of 2040 range from 1.1 to 1.33 million
people.4'
Stakeholders and Actors
The 712,738 people41 who live in the region might all be
considered stakeholders, but most, if they are able to turn on a faucet
and get clean water, are unlikely to become active participants in
regional water planning. Most, however, are aware that water use and
38. Middle Rio Grande Water Assembly Bylaws, art. IV, § 1 (1998) [hereinafter
MRGWA].
39. Action Committee of the Middle Rio Grande Water Assembly, Middle Rio Grande
Water Budget (Oct. 1999). The estimate of the rate of depletion has subsequently been
amended to 55,000 acre-fee per year.
40. JIM GROSS, MRGCOG, A BACKGROUND FOR WATER PLANNING AND SUMMARY OF
REPRESENTATIVE ISSUES (2000).
41. 2000 U.S. CENSUS (for Bernalillo, Sandoval, and Valencia counties in New Mexico).
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supply are in a precarious balance and it is not difficult for local water
authorities to convince citizens to act to conserve water during drought
conditions. A relatively few actors, as a result, represent the interests of a
variety of constituencies, or can claim to do so. Annual Assembly
meetings typically attract about 150 people. The MRG water planners'
listserv has about 150 subscribers. The number of participants in a series
of six community conversations held in the fall of 2002 in each county to
gather additional public input and to explore alternatives averaged
around thirty. It is important not to discount the influence that citizens
can exercise and to recognize that a process such as this one may raise
awareness of an issue, provide information, and mobilize individuals to
act. Citizens typically do so when they share a common understanding
and in a variety of ways communicate their interests through pressure
on their local officials. In the Water Assembly, however, the focus is on
direct actors with stakes in the regional planning process or in its
outcomes, whose actions help to shape that common understanding. The
characterizations below of the first two sets of actors, the MRG Water
Assembly and the Mid-Region Council of Governments, are more
detailed than descriptions of other entities. These two are supposed to be
partners in creating a regional water plan. Understanding their interests
and the dynamics of their relationship is important to assessing the
likelihood that the plan can succeed.
The Water Assembly
The Water Assembly's structure and mode of operation are
important. The Assembly has emphasized the importance of bringing
together people who may stand far apart on issues but who are willing
to search together for common ground. The Water Assembly, consisting
of any resident of the region who desires to participate, has convened
annually, but its governing body, the Action Committee, meets once a
and
month. The Assembly's bylaws give the Action Committee "broad
4 Until
itself."
Assembly
the
of
meetings
exclusive authority.. .apart from
2001, the Action Committee had been composed of representatives of
three broad groups of actors in "approximately equal representation":
specialists (hydrologists, engineers, biologists, economists, etc., in
academia, private practice, and public agencies), managers (representing
firms and agencies responsible for water provision or management), and
advocates for any definable interest affected by water management, such
as agriculture.'
42. MRGWA Bylaws, art. IV § 1. (July 24, 1998).
43. Id. art. IV § 2. The Action Committee also reserved open seats for a fourth
constituency, the Middle Rio Grande Indian Pueblos. The Pueblos have declined to
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This arrangement seemed satisfactory to participants during the
early phases of the process, when the Water Assembly's focus was
directed toward understanding the dimensions of the problemcharacteristics of the water supply, current demand, and projections of
future demand. But by the fall of 2000, attention began to shift toward
serious consideration of the objectives of the plan and how to achieve
them. From various quarters it began to be recognized that participation
in the process was not broadly based, and that the voices of a number of
affected interests from environmentalists to farmers to developers were
inadequately represented on the Action Committee. In early 2001,
several proposals were introduced to broaden and strengthen the
representation of advocates for different water uses.
The Water Assembly's bylaws were amended in April 2001, and
in June 2001 a special Assembly meeting chose representatives for three
new groups of advocates or constituency groups-"agricultural, cultural
and historic," "environmental," and "urban users and economic
development"--each of which was to elect five members to the Action
Committee." The diverse interests represented within each of the groups
are barely masked by their names. Most notably, the interests of current
urban residential water users and those of the development community
are markedly divergent. Actors representing developer interests moved
strategically during the convocation to capture all five seats for this
constituency on the Action Committee and have successfully rebuffed
attempts at several meetings of the Committee to revisit the rules that
permitted their seating.45
Cutting across this structure are working groups. Chaired by
Action Committee members, they draw as well on the interests and skills
of others. A Public Participation and Communication work group has
been responsible for developing a public education roadshow, annual
Water Assemblies and other forums, and several series of community
conversations, typically held in two locations in each of the three
counties in the Region. These have drawn increasingly larger numbers of
citizens as drought conditions have worsened in the last two years.

participate (see discussion infra in section titled The Six Middle Rio Grande Pueblo Indian
Communities).
44. MRGWA Bylaws, art. IV, § 2. (Apr. 18, 2001). The specialists and managers
constituency groups remained, but new representatives to the Action Committee were
selected by all of the groups.
45. Id. at art. IV, § 6. "Constituent groups are responsible for filling the membership of
their group." Id. They are not subject to any overriding rules mandating balance. "Capture"
by a faction is therefore a function of political organization. The Action Committee is
responsible to vote on the nominations of members from constituent groups but to date has
not done so.
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A technical work group, now reconstituted as the analysis team,
produced the water budget described above' and exercised oversight of
7
a contract that produced a study of current demand. The analysis team
evaluated the findings of a water supply study prepared under a
contract from the Army Corps of Engineers and the Interstate Stream
Commission.4 From this process there emerged a shared body of
information about the realities of the water situation in the MRG and a
common understanding of the goals that unite and divide them.
Moreover, through working together over the course of three years, the
individuals and entities involved developed trust in each other's
commitment to a fair process.
Upon this shared foundation, the Water Assembly through its
Action Committee began in 2000 a process of weighing alternative
actions. An Alternatives work group developed a database of specific
proposals and suggestions that have grown out of the work of the public
participation and technical work groups and the various public forums.
This is intended to lead to creating a set of scenarios-alternative
strategies to achieve the goal of "balancing all uses with renewable
supply." But at the same time the changes in constituent group
representation appear to have set back development of the epistemic
community that had emerged among Action Committee members.
Newly installed representatives of development interests, in particular,
have been reluctant to accept findings to which they had not been a
party. Others have responded negatively to what they regard as the
arrogance of the development bloc. The strength of that shared
foundation is being tested.
The Mid Region Council of Governments49
The Mid Region Council of Governments (MRCOG), a voluntary
association of counties, municipalities, and special districts within an
earlier established state planning district, sponsored some water
planning efforts in the early 1990s. These efforts were overtaken by

46.

Action Committee of the Middle Rio Grande Water Assembly, supra note 39.

47. JOHN SHOMAKER & ASSOCIATES, INC. HISTORICAL AND CURRENT WATER USE IN THE
MIDDLE RiO GRANDE REGION (2000).
48. S.S. PAPADOPULOS & ASSOCIATES, INC., MIDDLE Rio GRANDE WATER SUPPLY STUDY

(2000), availableat http://www.sspa.com/ashu/rio/start.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
49. Until recently the organization was known as the Middle Rio Grande Council of
Governments (MRGCOG), but it has been infelicitously renamed because one of its
member counties (Torrance) is not within the Middle Rio Grande watershed. The waterplanning region retains the earlier name. "Middle Region" may not have been used
because of connotations that its population consists of Hobbits, or for fear of copyright
infringement.
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studiesn that showed groundwater supplies to be far more uncertain
than heretofore understood. Local governments retreated from acting
collectively as they sought to sort out the implications of these findings
for their own jurisdictions. When the Water Assembly was organized in
1997, MRCOG staff recognized that a new effort, and potentially new
funding from the State, was possible. They quickly offered to come to the
aid of the newly founded organization with staff support and the
capacity to act as its fiscal agent. Much of MRCOG's work involved
regional planning, most recently its Focus 2050 exercise in regional land
use planning, and the organization viewed itself as "uniquely positioned
to establish a linkage between water planning and other regional
planning efforts."'
In 1998, the MRCOG Board of Directors established the Middle
Rio Grande Water Resources Board (WRB), comprised of "public and
tribal water rights holders" within the region, to "be responsible for
preparing,coordinating, and adopting a regional water plan in the defined
planning area." 2 To some among the Water Assembly's leadership, the
first two elements of the WRB's mission appeared to duplicate, to take
credit for, or to assume authority over the Assembly's work. That the
Board should adopt the Water Assembly's plan was not an issue.
Opinions within the Water Assembly's Action Committee varied
regarding its relationship with MRCOG and its WRB. Some viewed
MRCOG's proposal to assist the Assembly and act as its fiscal agent as a
thinly veiled attempt orchestrated to secure for MRCOG's own staff the
limited state funding available for regional water planning. However,
the prevailing view among Action Committee leaders was that the
importance of securing local officials' support for recommended policy
changes necessitated that the Water Assembly enter into a cooperative
arrangement with MRCOG, since the implementation of any regional
plan would finally depend on the buy-in of its member local
governments.
In an attempt to address these issues, the Water Assembly and
MRCOG signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in December
1998. The MOU established a "partnership in order to develop the
Middle Rio Grande regional water plan."5 3 It acknowledged the Water
Assembly's "special base of knowledge" and its ability to provide "an
open public forum to conduct essential dialogue on the values of water
and visions of future water needs," and recognized the Assembly's role
50. See, e.g., Thorn et al., supra note 37.
51. MRGCOG, ANNUAL REPORT (1999).
52. MRGCOG, RESOLUTION 98-5,3 (1998) (emphasis added).
53. Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in Regional Water Planning from
the MRGCOG to the Water Assembly, § I (Dec. 10, 1998) (on file with author).
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to "design and implement, with the assistance of MRCOG staff, a region"
wide public involvement and public education program. M
The MOU stated that the Water Assembly would "participate
directly" in Water Resources Board decision-making, by providing for all
"plan-related action items" to be "considered jointly" by the Board and
the Assembly's Action Committee It also provided for "administrative
and certain key staff support" to the Assembly (contingent upon
funding), including administering contracts needed to complete the
plan.m
Since that time, the working relationship between the two
organizations has been beset by conflicts. Normally, MRCOG might be
expected to have no independent interest in any particular waterplanning outcome apart from the collective interest of its member
governments. In fact, however, both institutional and individual selfinterests have been in play: principal-agent issues, turf struggles between
MRCOG staff and Water Assembly volunteers, power disparities among
MRCOG members, and informal guidance from Interstate Stream
Commission staff have all served to undermine the relationship.
MRCOG's decision in 1998 to create the WRB had contradictory
implications in terms of perceived threats to the Assembly's autonomy.
57
The terms of the resolution establishing the WRB on their face
challenged the Assembly's mission of developing a Regional Water Plan
"through an open, inclusive and participatory process." On the other
hand, the WRB included a number of officials who had also participated
as volunteers in the Action Committee, and who would be able to
oversee the work of MRCOG's water staff.
Tensions between the Water Assembly and MRCOG over issues
of direction and control of the planning process have resurfaced
periodically since the MOU was adopted. The terms of the MOU have
been clarified to define the partnership as being between the Water
Assembly and the WRB and to recognize the Assembly as "the single
negotiating table for non-governmental organizational and public"
input. In September 2001, MRCOG appeared to have defined for itself a
far less directive role in the development of the regional water plan, one
focused on "performing administrative and coordination functions,"
while the WRB and the Water Assembly together would be "responsible
"
for the technical oversight and planning and [RWP] production. m

54. Id. § II.
55. Id. § Ill.
56. Id. §§ V-VI.
57. MRGCOG REsoLunON 98-5, supra note 52, at 3-4.
58. Memorandum from MRCOG Acting Executive Director, to All Concerned, re:
Approach to Water Planning Program Coordination (Sept. 15,2001) (on file with author).
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However, conflict intensified during 2002, when MRCOG asserted that
its "Water Resources Board is providing oversight and policy direction"
to the RWP.- 9 More substantively, several Assembly activists came to
believe that MRCOG exerted undue influence on the process for
selecting a contractor to evaluate benefits and costs of proposed
alternative actions and for determining the scope of services the
contractor would perform.
Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District
The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District (MRGCD) was
created in 1925 in response to the saturation of irrigable land in the
middle Rio Grande valley because of aggradation of the river and a rise
in the water table, which had rendered a good deal of the valley's land
unusable, and increased the threat of flooding. 60 As a result, a small
group of property owners in the valley, backed by the Albuquerque
Chamber of Commerce, persuaded the legislature to pass the
Conservancy Act of 1923. Under this Act, the MRGCD was created in
order to provide flood control, irrigation, and drainage for the lands of
the Rio Grande valley. Though most small farmers, fearing they could
not pay the assessments that would be required, opposed creating the
District, the project went ahead. Ultimately the MRGCD took over the
works of 72 formerly self-governing acequias and dispossessing 40
percent of the District's constituents of their land. However, over time
the District has succeeded in reclaiming over 40,000 acres, making them
suitable for irrigation or other development as well as protecting the
land and its residents from flooding.
In achieving these goals, the MRGCD also acquired permits to
divert the water necessary to irrigate more than 130,000 acres, although
fewer than 70,000 acres are in production today. Because of a special
provision in its enabling legislation, the water rights and permits held by
the MRGCD are not subject to the forfeiture and abandonment statutes
applicable to other water right holders for nonuse. Though this provision
may be subject to constitutional challenge, 61 a greater threat is the fact
that rights on the Rio Grande have not been adjudicated and the courts
could significantly alter the quantity of the District's permitted rights. It

59. MRCOG ANNUAL REPORT (2002).
60. MIDDLE RiO GRANDE CONSERVANCY DISTRICT [hereinafter MRGCD], WATER
POLICIES PLAN 4-5 (1993).
61. See Lisa Brown, The Middle Rio GrandeConservancy District's Protected Water Rights:
Legal, Beneficial, or Against the Public Interest in New Mexico?, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1,
1(2000).
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is thus in the interest of the MRGCD to put as much of its water as possible to beneficial use.
As the amount of acreage farmed declines, the MRGCD is
seeking to broaden its mission and the public's understanding of what
constitutes beneficial use. In recent documents, the MRGCD has
portrayed itself as a guardian of riparian habitat, an essential partner in
protecting the ecology of the river through its lands and ditch systems,
an enhancer of recreation values, and a major source of recharge to the
Albuquerque aquifer.62 Moreover, the MRGCD wants to be viewed as a
trustee of the "most valuable asset in the valley-the water of the Rio
Grande. Eventually the growth of Albuquerque and the other towns of
the middle valley will depend on the water.. .being available for the
communities of the Rio Grande."' To this end, the MRGCD established a
water bank in 1995 to keep its 258,860 acre-feet of permitted rights in
beneficial use, enabling it to lease unused water on short-term contracts
to agricultural or other entities or individuals while retaining title to the
rights. A recent report stated,
Future Albuquerque area population growth and its
planned surface water development will increase net river
depletions at the expense of some current MRGCD surface
water use. We would expect that Albuquerque will enter
the water rights or water purchase or rental market as a
buyer of MRGCD water.'
The rules under which the District operates leave unclear whose
interests it represents. Though the majority of its "constituents" hold
small tracts of land, the seven-member MRGCD Board of Directors is
composed primarily of relatively large landholders. The Board is elected
by property owners within the benefited area, though they do not have
to live there. Eligible voters choose directors representing the county
where they own property, and one member-at-large. While each of the
other counties have one member, Bernalillo County (home to
Albuquerque) gets three, though it has only 17 percent of the irrigated
acreage in the District, according to the District's current estimate.
Valencia County has 42 percent. Voting in MRGCD elections is a
cumbersome process, and as a result, few eligible voters actually cast
ballots. Although this system might seem to favor the interests of
irrigators, the District's literature also stresses that it holds "important
62.
63.

MRGCD, supra note 60, at 35-45.
Id. at 43.

64. FRANK A.WARD ET AL., N.M. WATER RES. RESEARCH INST., INSTITUTIONAL
ADJUSTMENTS FOR COPING WITH PROLONGED AND SEVERE DROUGHT IN THE Rio GRANDE
BASIN 43 (2001).
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natural assets of the middle valley in trust for the public."6 Some critics
have questioned whether the current institutions for governance of the
MRGCD are compatible with either conception of its mission.
City of Albuquerque
The City of Albuquerque is the dominant pumper of water in the
region, but all municipalities with public, private or hybrid water utility
systems are drawing on groundwater and face the problem of
unsustainable mining of the Albuquerque aquifer. The city intends,
within five years, to replace most of its pumping with withdrawal and
treatment of surface water. Albuquerque has contracted for 48,200 acrefeet of San Juan-Chama water, which, for the past 30 years, it has not
used for its own needs. This flow has been instrumental in enabling New
Mexico to meet its Compact obligations. The city is proposing to divert
twice its share of San Juan-Chama water and to return half of that to the
river as treated effluent through its wastewater treatment facility (as it
currently does with its pumped groundwater).
Absent a proportionate decrease in diversions by other users, the
city's diversion is likely to have a significant effect on actual river flow.
Albuquerque has embarked on a conservation program that has reduced
municipal and industrial water use considerably, although per capita
consumption is still much greater than in El Paso or Tucson. The city is
an active participant in the RWP process but is also moving ahead
quickly with its own plans while keeping the Action Committee
informed.
The Rio Grande Silvery Minnow
This endangered species of fish, whose range is now limited to a
reach of the river south of Albuquerque, can serve here as a stand-in for
a set of actors whose interests are principally environmental-the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, the Alliance for the Rio Grande Heritage (a
coalition that includes a broad spectrum of environmental
organizations), and others. Press accounts of the drying of the minnow's
habitat in the summers of 1996, 2000, and 2002 portrayed the issue as a
struggle between fish and farmers. Emergency measures occasioned by
litigation have resulted in reduced diversions by the MRGCD and
emergency releases of water stored upstream.
An interim solution for a three-year period beginning in 2001
involved an agreement by the Rio Grande Compact Commission

65.

MRGCD, supra note 60, at 45.
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allowing New Mexico to store up to 100,000 acre-feet of water in
upstream reservoirs during the spring runoff to provide more water to
the river when the silvery minnow is threatened. In the fall of 2002 it
appeared that the minnow might indeed be extirpated within its native
habitat. A federal judge invoked the Endangered Species Act to order an
emergency release from a reservoir storing diverted San Juan-Chama
water. On appeal from the City of Albuquerque, whose mayor claimed
ownership of the water6 despite its current lack of infrastructure to put it
to use; the MRGCD; and the State of New Mexico; the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals stayed the ruling. Though this situation illustrates the
uncertainty of a policy environment characterized by multiple and
conflicting property rights regimes or institutions, the action arena in
which the conflict is being conducted is not that of regional water
planning, and the situation remains too volatile to explore further in this
article.
The Six Middle Rio Grande Pueblo Indian Communities
Eight sovereign tribal entities-Pueblos--occupy land within the
MRG water-planning region. Two of these, Jemez and Zia, are located on
the Jemez River, a tributary of the Rio Grande. The other six--Cochiti,
Santo Domingo, San Felipe, Santa Ana, Sandia, and Isleta-occupy
villages along the main stem of the Rio Grande. The largest of these
Pueblos has a resident population of about 3000, the smallest about 500.
Each is a self-governing entity, but the six Pueblos located along the Rio
Grande have formed a consortium to act collectively with respect to the
regional water planning effort: they pay attention to it but do not
participate. Regional water planners have had difficulty understanding
the reasons for this and express frustration because ultimately decisions
made regarding Pueblo water rights are likely to affect those of every
other user on the river. Yet the situation seems to offer the tribes fewer
incentives to participate than to stay out.
Pueblo members would seem to have no interest in "owning"
the problem defined as balancing use and supply. Over centuries they
have adapted to whatever water came down the river, using very little of
it. As individuals and families, Pueblo people know they use (and waste)
far less than city or suburban dwellers.
Tribal leaders, on the other hand, have different incentives.
Irrigated agriculture is in decline, and water right claims made on the
basis of their historical uses or practicably irrigable acreage face an

66.
Al.

Tania Soussan, Cities and Farmers Vow to Fight, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 20, 2002, at
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uncertain reception by the federal courts.6 7 Pueblo leaders therefore must
prove up their claims by demonstrating the importance of their water
use for economic development-the creation of viable homelands for
their people. The effect is to encourage the development of water-using
projects-golf courses, resort hotels, and the like-that put "facts on the
ground" to justify claims to a larger quantity of water. Prior to
quantification of their rights, the Pueblo leaders have no incentive to
participate in arrangements that would imply a need for less water.'
Historically-justified suspicion of the motives of the State with
regard to Indian land and water rights is reinforced periodically by
decisions of the State Engineer that fail to acknowledge tribes' water
rights or the impact of those decisions on them. The tribes view the RWP
process as state-mandated and ultimately state-controlled. However,
tribal water rights are neither derived from the state but are prior to and
independent of state regulation, nor are these rights affected by
requirements of the Rio Grande Compact. 69 Though Pueblo rights are not
yet adjudicated, and therefore not quantified, tribal leaders view those
rights as better protected in a federal, rather than a state-sponsored,
arena.
The Pueblos have been offered a place at the Action Committee
table as a separate constituency. However, they are not constituencies
but sovereign governments. No other governments, as governments, are
at the table. The other actors cannot make credible, government-togovernment commitments, yet any attempts on the Pueblos' part to cooperate may be viewed by others as commitments that could be used at
some point to compromise their rights. In a rights-based context, the
Pueblos feel they have little room for discussion.
These descriptions of the actors and their interests are obviously
incomplete and overly general. Nonetheless, they provide some insight
into the complexity and heterogeneity of the interests at stake in

67. The adjudication of pueblo water rights involves assigning both a quantity of water
and a priority date. In the over appropriated Rio Grande, both are critical. The outcome for
the Pueblos is far from certain, however, even for rights they may be allocated under a
theory that the rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo-the amount they
historically used-should govern. Spanish law provided for balancing and protecting the
interests of various parties, and the U.S. Supreme Court has in recent years sought to
balance Indian and non-Indian interests in its rulings. See CHARLES DUMARS, MARILYN
O'LEARY, & ALBERT UTroN, PUEBLO INDIAN WATER RIGHTS (1984).
68. Fidel Lorenzo of Acoma Pueblo spoke at a Water Assembly Action Committee
meeting, January 19, 2000, of the danger of "inadvertent quantification" if the Pueblos were
to participate as full players in regional water planning forums.
69. This characterization of the Pueblos' position is based on a statement delivered by
Roy Montoya, administrator of Santa Ana Pueblo, on behalf of the Middle Rio Grande
Pueblos Water Coalition, to the 3rd Water Assembly, Albuquerque, N.M., Mar. 27, 1999.
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attempts to achieve an equitable allocation of water through collective
action.
WHITHER THE MRG PROCESS?
Creating Conditions for Collective Action
Crafting an arena or political space that individuals will find
conducive to collective action is an exercise in institutional design.
Institutions are patterns of interaction structured by rules, norms, and
shared strategies that provide incentives for behaving in predictable
ways in recurring action situations. 7 Institutions are the rules-in-use in
an action situation-here, the imbalance between the water supply in the
MRG and the demands on that supply-that determine the likelihood
that people in that situation will either cooperate or defect.
Operational rules help to order people's day-to-day actions in
the real world. Unless their basic interests are threatened, it is relatively
easy for individuals to decide to adjust operations within those rules. It
is somewhat harder, more costly, and time consuming to change the
operational rules. They have been put in place according to collective
choice rules that provide the criteria for making or changing them. To
change the rules about how collective choices are made-the scope of
decisions, who is allowed to participate in making them, how they are
made, and under what conditions-is more difficult still. Collective
choice rules are themselves outcomes of even more basic prior decisions
in the realm of constitutional choice that comprise the foundational
principles of any collective entity. Note that each of these conceptual
arenas of choice can be found in collectivities at any scale, from local
arenas such as the Water Assembly to nation states and entities formed
by international treaties. 7 Figure 1 illustrates these conceptual
relationships.

70. See generally Elinor Ostrom, Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 35
(Paul A. Sabatier ed., 1999).
71. See generally Larry L. Kiser & Elinor Ostrom, The Three Worlds of Action: A
MetatheoreticalSynthesis of Institutional Approaches, in STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL INQUIRY 179
(Elinor Ostrom ed., 1982); MICHAEL D. McGINNIS & VINCENT OSTROM, DEMOCRATIC
TRANSFORMATIONS: FROM THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY TO SELF-GOVERNANCE? 8-11
(1999).
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Figure 1
Relationships Between Conceptual "Arenas of Choice"
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Rectangles A, C, and E are analytically separable "arenas of choice."
Actors making "real-world" decisions within the operational arena A are
bound by rules established through prior collective choice decisions. Some
decision situations, however, fall within the "gray area" B and require
changes in the collective choice arena C that alter the incentives or
strategies available to them in the operational arena. Likewise, some
collective choice situations (in area D) cannot be resolved without more
fundamental changes in institutional arrangements in the constitutional
arena. The greater number and heterogeneity of actors and interests
involved at "deeper" levels increases complexity, making decisions more
costly and time consuming.

Within the water planning action arena created by the Water
Assembly, its Action Committee, the MRCOG, and its Water Resources
Board, it should be relatively easy for participants to agree to take
actions to adjust their operations within existing operational rules.
Actions that require changes in those rules are subject to the collective
choice rules of each of the entities represented as well as those
constituting the rules for the action arena itself-the bylaws of the Water
Assembly, the memoranda of understanding regarding the partnership,
etc. But agreements at any level, and particularly those that require or
result from changing collective choice rules, are only likely to be possible
if the action arena provides sufficient incentives to cooperate for
participants to moderate the core beliefs shaped by their own
institutional affiliations. To succeed, the MRG water planning action
arena itself must be structured by collective choice rules that contribute
to, rather than inhibit, resolution of conflict over actors' core beliefs.
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Current Status
The general course of action of the MRG Water Assembly'
involves a negotiation process intended to lead to "the balancing of
stakeholder and general public needs." The Plan refers to a yet-to-beidentified "means for integrating the negotiating results into the
action/scenario evaluation process,"7 designed to achieve the goal of
"balancing demand with renewable supply." 4 The final product of
further planning steps is to be a bundle of actions that make up a
selected or recommended scenario. The process leading to that ultimate
choice involves identifying criteria to be used to quantify "values"
assigned to each action, then "summing" them to an "overall value for
the scenario. "
The document describing this process is short on steps and
responsibilities. Although the beginning of this stage of the process
involves analyzing and evaluating alternative actions, final decisions
about the plan's content are supposed to result from negotiations among
members of the Assembly's Action Committee. However, the Action
Committee does not represent governments (though several federal
agency and local public officials have participated as individuals in its
deliberations). Thus any plan agreed upon will reflect non-governmental
organizations and interests. The decisions will not be authoritative.
Instead, the resulting plan will, if agreements can be reached, be a set of
recommendations to the Water Resources Board about the management
of water in the region. Many of these recommendations are certain to
focus on changes in water operations within existing rules and
institutional arrangements-actions
to promote efficiency and
conservation of water. But it is likely that broader decisions will be
required of local governments and others to balance the region's water
budget. Some may be made by voluntary agreements. Others may be
imposed by the State (e.g., through legislative action arising from
development of a state water plan) or even by federal regulatory,
statutory, or judicial action.
Some participants expect that close contact between the Water
Assembly's leadership and MRCOG's Water Resources Board will result
in enough interaction with local governmental actors while the plan is
being developed to gain the WRB's de facto buy-in to the outcomes of
the process. The plan's stated aim is to provide "well coordinated
72. MRGWA, Regional Water Plan for the Middle Rio Grande Region, ver. 0.5 (Feb. 2,
2001), available at http://www.waterassembly.org/pdfs/plan-wa3905w.pdf.
73. Id.§ 4.4.
74. Id.§ 8.2.
75. Id. § 9.0 to 9.3.
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guidance to Local, State, and Federal officials in.. .making and
implementing public policies and regulations" for the region. 76 The
leadership hopes that the plan's recommendations, once adopted by the
WRB, will be sufficiently compelling that governments and public
authorities in the region will find it difficult to resist adopting them as
policy.
Why the Process May Fail
There is reason to question whether such a comprehensive
approach can succeed. Current institutional arrangements provide few
incentives for the actors to work within the AC's "negotiating table" as
an action arena. Three instances of potential institutional failure will
serve to exemplify the problem.
1. Within the Assembly itself, collective choice rules are
embodied in the bylaws. Changes in the bylaws were
intended to assure representation of a broad spectrum of
interests in the Action Committee. Instead, some saw them
as enabling a narrow constituency to capture a significant
share of Action Committee seats, marginalizing other
voices. One consequence of this has been to politicize the
decision process within the Committee itself, forcing voting
on issues on which many members would prefer to try to
achieve consensus. Those feeling excluded have threatened
to challenge in court the legitimacy of any plan that is not
to their liking.
2. The unease and distrust that characterize the Water
Assembly's partnership with the MRCOG and its Water
Resources Board stem in part from uncertainty about the
rules that define their relationships and authority. No
single set of actors at the regional level has authority to
approve or implement a regional water plan.' The state
legislature intended, in mandating and funding regional
water planning, to enable regions to plan for their water
future. The Handbook78 outlines a set of requirements for
what such a plan should contain but provides few clues
76. MRGWA, supra note 72, Preface.
77. Authority for managing the State's water rests with the State Engineer or the Interstate Stream Commission except to the extent that rights to its use have been appropriated
and are recognized by the State. This would seem to leave planning to a conversation
among appropriators, would-be appropriators, and the State Engineer, contradicting the
purpose of regional water planning.
78. HANDBOOK, supra note 33.
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about how it will be put into effect. A number of current
and former participants have argued that regional water
plans will be worth little unless they address the
institutional arrangements required to govern how the
selected alternatives will be carried out.7
Embedded in the very idea of regional water planning was
the New Mexico legislature's tacit admission that existing
institutional arrangements, which rely primarily on
administering water rights by seniority and which avoid
defining the public welfare of the state or the regions, are
inadequate to resolve the underlying issues of how the
state's scarce and unpredictable supply of water ought to
be allocated. Water right holders and claimants clearly have
a stake in the outcomes of planning, but so also do the vast
majority of New Mexicans who have no such rights. The
Handbook is equivocal about how to empower people in each
region to engage in real decision making around water
allocation and uses. Among its "required assumptions" for
planners is "that New Mexico and federal water law will
not change,"'O but it also provides for the possibility of welljustified exceptions to those assumptions, and it specifically
invites regional planning entities to "propose changes to
New Mexico water law." It seems unlikely that the MRG
process as it is now structured will facilitate agreement on
in
changes
recommendations-including
broader
operational and collective choice rules-for deciding how
water should be managed in the Region.
3. The Middle Rio Grande Pueblos, as noted earlier, have
little incentive to participate in a state-initiated process that
may threaten their sovereignty and inadvertently quantify
their water rights. Their "prior and paramount" water
79. The Water Assembly's recommendations, when adopted by the Water Resources
Board, are also to become a component of a "statewide water plan, built on the information
in sixteen regional water plans." Though the structure is to be built from the periphery
toward the center, this process offers a unicentric or hierarchic vision, within which the
principal role of the regional plans is to support and justify the statewide plan. Ensuring
that the regional plans are structured according to the official template helps to ensure their
compatibility and conformity to the state plan. The logic of this approach is obvious, since
the original purpose of creating regional plans was to provide justification for the state to be
able to fend off other states' (i.e., Texas's) attempts to appropriate New Mexico's water by
showing that New Mexicans have already put in place plans for using it-to make credible
the assertion of the public welfare argument for disallowing water transfers out-of-state. Id.
at 2.
80. Id. at 7.
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rights, although yet unquantified, are likely to be
substantial. Ongoing negotiations (with federal support) in
other venues provide in the Pueblos' view more favorable
arenas for advancing their interests. For the MRG water
planners, however, lack of certainty about the status and
quantity of the Pueblos' rights and how they may choose to
use them constitutes a fundamental obstacle to achieving a
comprehensive regional plan.
Given these and other institutional constraints, a challenge
facing the Water Assembly and its partners has been how to constitute
an action arena for negotiating a plan so that all parties with significant
interests will have incentives to cooperate in taking collective action.
How this arena is constituted can, as the above examples show, affect
participants' beliefs about the efficacy of collective action, and thus their
calculations about whether to continue to cooperate. Though the
Assembly has committed itself rhetorically to an "open, inclusive and
participatory process," questions continue to be raised about its essential
fairness as well as about whether it can achieve a collectively desired
outcome worth the investment of participants' time and energy.81
Lessons from Watershed Planning
The experiences of regions engaged in watershed planning
across the United States can be instructive in understanding conditions
for facilitating stakeholder cooperation. Though watershed planning
often focuses on concrete environmental objectives and projects other
than water supply and uses, the Water Assembly's leadership has
encouraged participants to think of the MRG water-planning region as a
watershed. As described by Blomquist and Schlager, in holistic,
integrated watershed management, planning begins with the premise
that a watershed is a natural system within which all actions affecting
either demand or supply are interdependent. This physical unity
supposedly makes the watershed the appropriate level at which to
situate institutions for water resource management. Since watershed81. For parties to be willing to invest time and energy in a negotiating process, each
must be able to trust that the process is fair, including ensuring that each interested party
has an adequate opportunity to express its views and make them understood, that the
decision making rules won't be stacked against it, and that it has an avenue of recourse if
decisions are taken in violation of the rules. Because participation is costly, parties must
also be reasonably assured that the process has a probability of achieving a desired outcome and that they can rely on the credibility of commitments made by other parties-i.e.,
once taken, decisions will be fairly carried out by those responsible. These conditions are
similar to those in an "assurance game." See ELINOR OSTROM, ROY GARDNER, & JAMES
WALKER, RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES, 294-97 (1994).
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wide decision-making organizations usually don't exist a priori, they
should be created. This approach is comprehensive; all significant
stakeholders should participate and decision making should be by
consensus. Policies should be integrated and coordinated, presumably
by a single entity, a "watershed authority."8
The logic of the approach the Water Assembly is pursuing
suggests its intention to adopt and recommend to policy makers a single,
comprehensive, plan to balance all uses with renewable supply. Does
this imply a need to create a new political entity at the regional level to
manage the water resource? Perhaps not.3 But whether or not a single
regional water authority is required to implement such a unitary plan,
can conditions for collective action noted above be met feasibly and
fairly in a "watershed" of three-quarters of a million people with diverse
preferences, information, and endowments?
The process of selecting representatives (or categories of
interests to be represented) in a negotiating process is itself a political act,
and it can lead to formulating a plan that reflects only an elite consensus.
Moreover, any aggregation rule proposed, whether majority rule or any
other criterion that recognizes an individual's or group's claim on
watershed resources, is likely to open opportunities for some individuals
or groups to gain advantage over others-institutionalizing distinctions
in physical or in social, economic, or cultural position."
Furthermore, if the aggregation rule is consensus, and if the plan
to be a single, comprehensive solution to the problem of
intended
is
balancing uses with renewable supply, then every decision required to
achieve the solution must be agreed to by everyone at the negotiating
table. This may be impossible. What we have seen about conditions for
collective action tells us that people will not come to or stay at the table if
82. William Blomquist & Edella Schlager, Watershed Management from the Ground
Up: Political Science and the Explanation of Regional Governance Arrangements (1999)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory
and Policy Analysis).
83. Developing a workable plan may not require creating a central authority, even
under a holistic approach, if it is flexible. Buying in to the plan may be as simple as a city
agreeing to take local actions such as revising ordinances or land use plans, in conformity
with the plan's objective. Sharing information about steps one is taking to implement the
plan could enable others to monitor and learn from the action, assess how well it works in
achieving results, and make course corrections. Because of uncertainties, entities may be
willing to commit to long-range goals but not specific targets. If an all or nothing standard
is adopted, an entity may withdraw rather than participate at all, defeating the intent of the
plan. There might be an ongoing role for the Action Committee in monitoring and evaluating various initiatives, developing scorecards, and reporting to the public. There may be
conditions under which parties to an agreement might want to give the MRCOG's Water
Resources Board or another region-wide public entity authority to enforce an agreement or
resolve a dispute. However, this would require changes at the constitutional level of choice.
84. Blomquist & Schlager, supra note 82, at 44.
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they perceive the price as too high in terms of their own interest, or in
relation to the price another party is being asked to pay.
At its best, the dispute resolution arena offered by the MRG
planning framework is only one choice available to most parties. In both
2000 and 2002 the struggle over water for farmers' fields or for the
silvery minnow was played out not in negotiations among actual
farmers and advocates for environmental values in the regional planning
process but in federal court.
It seems likely that the more tightly the Action Committee tries
to specify the planning objectives and define the set of alternatives
considered feasible, and the more the leadership tries to achieve the
correct balance of interests at the table, the less attractive this action
arena will become for negotiating practical steps toward solving the
region's problems. The time and energy the Action Committee spent on
the issue of representation, including creating new constituency groups,
appeared to some a waste of time, and to others an effort by leadership
to decide who the relevant stakeholders are and to award them a defined
number of seats at the table.
Despite its apparent rationality and consistency, Blomquist and
Schlager argue that integrated watershed management is seldom
undertaken in fact.8 Instead, real watershed management in western
states has evolved in a messier, bottom-up fashion. In four cases in
California and Colorado, various self-organized communities of interest,
including informal associations and incorporated cities, came together in
response to problems at the watershed or sub-watershed level. These
different communities claimed their own places at the table. Already
organized, they either withheld or granted cooperation and resources in
making inter-organizational or inter-governmental water resource
management arrangements. Some of these arrangements encompassed
the whole watershed, while some involved only bi-lateral cooperation or
self-initiated action.
85. Managing water resources is, of course, only a part of watershed management.
Most collaborative resource management partnerships are concerned with a broad range of
environmental issues involving multiple resources. They tend to focus on projects such as
creating and implementing habitat conservation plans or coordinated resource
management plans. Evaluations of these efforts have not examined the nature of the
institutions that emerge from these collaborative efforts. Instead, they focus on either the
difficult process of ensuring fair representation of stakeholder interests, or on whether the
projects are successful in terms of their own objectives, usually protecting or restoring an
aspect of watershed health. An example of the former can be found in Christine W.
Coughlin et al., A Systematic Assessment of Collaborative Resource Management Partnerships (Ann Arbor, School of Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan,
1999), available at http://www.snre.umich.edu/emi/pubs/crmp.htm (last visited Apr. 1,
2003), which selected 10 case studies (from a database of 450 collaborative partnerships
across the United States) for qualitative analysis that dealt largely with process issues.
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Blomquist and Schlager conclude that in many real-world
situations watershed planning is not about the creation of new,
resource
integrated
undertake
that
entities
watershed-wide
management. Instead, successful watershed management institutions are
adaptive and build on relevant local knowledge. These institutions often
involve new arrangements among preexisting sub-regional or regionwide groups with particular interests at stake, enabling them to respond
to specific issues affecting the watershed.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: A POLYCENTRIC
REGIONAL WATER PLAN
These observations about how many regional arrangements are
actually forged suggest how water planners might avoid the pitfalls-the
disincentives to successful collective action-inherent in overreaching
for a holistic solution while not abandoning the goal of achieving a
sustainable balance between all uses and the available supply of water.
For the Middle Rio Grande, the first step may be to redefine the
role of the Water Assembly's Action Committee, which serves as the
Assembly's board of directors. As such, its principal responsibility
should be to assure the integrity of regional water planning as an
inclusive public process open to all interests. With its limited
membership and voting rules, it should not try to become the action
arena-the "single negotiation table at which all non-governmental and
public involvement in the plan occurs."" Nor should it act as gatekeeper
regarding who may legitimately sit at the negotiating table.
Instead, the Action Committee might announce the following:
This is the situation we are facing, and here are the mission
and goals to which we've agreed so far, in the interest of
leaving to future generations the resource endowments
with which we have been blessed. Anyone proposing an
action or policy decision that contributes to accomplishing
our mission (or achieving any goal that supports it) is
welcome at the table under the auspices of the Assembly to
try to achieve agreements on collective action with others
so inclined. We will do what we can to facilitate your
efforts.
Such an approach would build on the collective understandings
reached to date while admitting that no one has the total solution to such
a complex issue. It would preserve local and organizational autonomy,
86. Memorandum from Lee Brown (Water Assembly Chair) to Larry Blair and Dennis
Foltz, 1 (MRGCOG), (Sept. 29, 2000) (on file with the author).
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encourage cooperation and coordination among groups and entities that
see it as worthwhile and in their interests to do so, and thus legitimize
the process. Moreover, it would encourage innovation, adaptation, and
learning.
Such an arena might better accommodate a complex action
situation. The mission, goals, bylaws, and experiences of the Water
Assembly constitute an overall constitutional framework of rules, norms,
and shared strategies. Within this framework, self-organized sets of
actors have incentives to make agreements that can become pieces of an
evolving and adaptive plan. Clearly, not all such agreements may be
complementary, and there will be issues to work out through negotiation
across non-complementary interests. But at those points it will become
clear who needs to be at the table: individuals, groups, entities that have
interests at stake in the particular issue at hand. Negotiations under
these auspices cannot be limited to non-governmental actors, who could
only make recommendations about actions that require decisions by
authoritative governmental bodies. This is because people in negotiating
situations need to be able to make credible commitments to each other. If
the Water Assembly is unable to provide an arena for such work by
itself, it may be possible for the Water Resources Board and the
Assembly to do so together.'
This approach may not yield a neat, comprehensive solution to
the problem of balancing all uses with renewable supply. But it is
probable that there is no single magic bullet, only partial solutions to
particular problems, where the scale of any arrangement depends on the
scale at which the problem is perceived. More than 15 years ago, Helen
Ingram observed that despite the fact that watersheds are viewed as
discrete systems, "[tihe "appropriate geographical and other boundaries
within which to identify interests.. .should be drawn from an
understanding of the stakes rather than river basin boundaries .... [Tihe
experience of impacts is often discrete and localized."8
87. The Action Committee and the WRB may have more specific responsibilities in
defining collective choice rules, for example, how tightly to specify plan objectives and
timetables. Despite a sense of urgency on the part of many activists, putting strict
timeframes and deadlines on achieving the plan's goals may be counterproductive. Within
specific negotiated agreements and arrangements, deadlines are obviously needed, since
commitments to taking actions cannot simply be open-ended promises to get around to it
someday. For some situations, not specifying timeframes may make achieving agreements
easier, reducing the sense of threat. Actors will have different discount rates, resulting from
the nature of their interests. Collective action is only possible when enough people
recognize that pursuit of their interests at the expense of others is very likely to result in a
worse outcome for everyone. They must also believe that what they gain by cooperating
won't come at too high a price.
88. Helen M. Ingram at al., Guidelines for Improved Institutional Analysis in Water
Resource Planning,20 WATER RESOURCES RES. 3,326 (1984).
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Is a holistic or an adaptive approach to regional water planning
in the MRG preferable? Empirical studies comparing the success of these
two approaches in creating fundamental institutional change are lacking.
Blomquist and Schlager's casese suggest that, in practice, arrangements
that stick are made among those parties that have real interests in
working them out, are adaptive to concrete situations, and are often the
result of responses by those whose water supply already has been
impacted. 90
The open negotiating arena suggested here offers the likelihood
of improvement over the ad hoc responses to water resource issues cited
in the cases Blomquist and Schlager discuss. For those who are ready to
work on solutions, the Water Assembly's work to date provides an
essential foundation of shared knowledge about the action situation-the
fundamental issues that underlie the specific problem situations all the
user interests face-and a range of alternative actions and policy
proposals whose potential impacts have already received some analysis.
To the extent that parties can begin with these premises, they can enter
the arena already in possession of the best available information about
the situation they face and with a common understanding about the
limits they might agree to work within to craft solutions, even partial
ones.
Second, it offers the possibility that operational level agreements
that may be made between parties within the broad framework of a
regional plan can be supplemented and enhanced by being embedded in
a context that allows for or encourages institutional innovation. The
Water Assembly and the Water Resources Board remain aware of this
larger context. They are in a position to advocate and facilitate changes
in the collective choice and constitutional arenas of action that can
advance cooperation and promote governance arrangements that are
scaled appropriately to the problems at hand.

89.
90.

Blomquist & Schlager, supra note 82.
Id. at 38-39. See also Gary D. Libecap, The Conditionsfor Successful Collective Action, in

LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE: HETEROGENErrY AND COOPERATION IN

TWO DOMAINS 161 (Robert O Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995).

